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NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOL LEGISLATION-
1956*
ROBERT H. WETTACH'i
The General Assembly, at its regular session in 1955, enacted a
law for the enrollment of pupils in the public schools.1 This had beeti
recommended by the Governor's Special Advisory Committee on Edu-
cation and was designed to meet the "School Segregation" decision.2
The Governor's Committee was of the opinion that "the enrollment and
assignment of children in the schools is by its very nature a local mat-
ter." It recommended that "complete authority over these matters
should be vested in the county and city boards of education." And
this is exactly what the 1955 Pupil Enrollment statute appears to do.8
By Joint Resolution,4 the General Assembly also approved "the re-
port of the Governor's Special Advisory Committee on Education and
the brief of the Attorney General of North Carolina filed in the Supreme
Court in the pending segregation cases" and provided for "a continuing
study of the problems which may arise as a result of the decision of
the United States Supreme Court on May 17, 1954" by creating "The
Advisory Committee on Education" which was directed to advise the
Governor, the General Assembly, the State Board of Education and
local school boards throughout the state. The April 5th., 1956, report
of this committee (the Pearsall Committee) recommended that a special
* This article follows the plan of "Statutory Changes in North Carolina,"
which the LAW REVIEW publishes every two years following the regular session
of the General Assembly. It is descriptive of the legislation passed. It raises
questions and points to answers. Interested readers are directed to much more
exhaustive treatments of the problems raised by the public school segregation cases
and recent state legislation. The RACE REmATioNS LAw RIEiaR , which began
publishing in February, 1956, contains court decisions, legislation, administrative
action, Attorneys General opinions and general articles on pertinent subjects. See:
State Action: A Study of Requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 RAcE
RL. L. REP. 613-637 (1956) ; The Three-Judge Federal Court: A Study of
Injunctions against Discriminatory State Action, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 811-832
(1956). See also: McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed." A Study of School
Desegregation, 31 N. Y. U. L. REv. 991-1090 (1956); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Equal Protection--Legality of Plans for Maintaining School Segregation,
54 MICH. L. REv. 1142-1170 (1956) ; Note, Obstacles to Federal Jurisdiction: New
Barriers to Non-Segregated Public Education in Old Forms, 104 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 974-997 (1956) ; Legislative Proposals in the South against Integration, 16
LAWYERS GurLD Rxv. 83 (1956).
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-176 to 115-179 (1955).
- Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U. S. 294 (1955).
Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1955, 33 N. C. L. REV. 513,
552-555.
'N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, Resolution 29.
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session of the General Assembly be called "this summer to consider
submitting to the people the question of changes in our State Constitu-
tion."
"We recommend that this Legislature cause to be submitted to a
vote of the people of North Carolina constitutional amendments, or a
single amendment to achieve these desirable and, we think, necessary
results:
"1. Authority for the General Assembly to provide from public
funds financial grants to be paid toward the education of any child
assigned against the wishes of his parents to a school in which the races
are mixed-such grants to be available for education only in non-sec-
tarian schools and only when such child cannot be conveniently assigned
to a non-mixed public school.
"2. Authority for any local unit created pursuant to law and under
conditions to be prescribed by the General Assembly, to suspend by
majority vote the operation of the public schools in that unit, notwith-
standing present constitutional provisions for public schools."
AcTs OF THE 1956 SPECIAL SESSION
The 1956 Extra Session of the General Assembly followed the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Education.
Chapter 1 is an act to amend the Constitution of North Carolina,
Article IX, by adding a new section 12, as follows:
"12. Education expense grants and local option. Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Constitution, the General Assembly may
provide for payment of education expense grants from any State or
local public funds for the private education of any child for whom no
public school is available or for the private education of a child who
is assigned against the wishes of his parent, or the person having con-
trol of such child, to a public school attended by a child of another
race. A grant shall be available only for education in a nonsectarian
school, and in the case of a child assigned to a public school attended
by a child of another race, a grant shall, in addition, be available only
when it is not reasonable and practicable to reassign such child to a
public school not attended by a child of another race.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the
General Assembly may provide for a uniform system of local option
whereby any local option unit, as defined by the General Assembly, may
choose by a majority vote of the qualified voters in the unit who vote
on the question to suspend or to authorize the suspension of the opera-
tion of one or more or all of the public schools in that unit.
"No action taken pursuant to the authority of this Section shall in
any manner affect the obligation of the State or any political subdivision
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or agency thereof with respect to any indebtedness heretofore or here-
after created."
Chapter 2 provided for a general election to be held on September 8,
1956, to vote on the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of
North Carolina.
The above amendment authorizing education expense grants for pri-
vate education and authorizing a local vote to suspend local schools was
approved by the voters by a margin of four to one and is now part of
the North Carolina Constitution.
Chapter 3. Education Expense Grants.
Every child, residing in the State, is entitled to apply for an educa-
tion expense grant if (a) no public school is available or (b) the child
is assigned to a public school attended by a child of another race,
against the wishes of his parent or guardian. As further conditions,
such grants shall be available only (1) for education in a private non-
sectarian school and (2) when it is not reasonable and practicable to
reassign such child to a public school not attended by a child of another
race.
A nonsectarian school is defined as a school whose operation is not
controlled directly or indirectly by any church or sectarian body or by any
individual or individuals acting on behalf of a church or sectarian body.
State and Local education expense grants are authorized, the amount
to be equal to the per capita cost of public education to the State or the
local government during the preceding school year. On the basis of
expenditures during 1955-56, a state grant would amount to $135.00.
Local expense grants would be much less.
The conditions of eligibility for a state education expense grant,
as well as for a local grant, are, as follows:
1. Application must be filed with the Board of Education of the
Administrative unit within which the child resides.5 This application
shall be on standard forms prescribed by the State Board of Education,
shall specify the number of school days for which the grant is requested
and be signed, under oath or affirmation, by the parent or guardian of
the child for whom the application is made.
2. The Board of Education shall approve an application, if it finds
(a) Residence of the child within the administrative unit; and
(b) That there is no public school available for such child or
such child is now assigned against the wishes of his parent or guardian
to a public school attended by a child of another race, and it is not prac-
' Residence may refer to a child's legal domicile or to the child's actual residence
at the time. Note, Statutes-Interpretation of "Residence," 33 N. C. L. REv. 697(1955). Note, Residence or Domicile-Non-resident Motorist Statutes, 33 N. C.
L. Ray. 680 (1955).
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ticable to reassign such child to a public school not attended by a child
of another race; and
(c) Such child is enrolled in or has been accepted for enrollment
in a private nonsectarian school, recognized and approved by Article
32 of this Chapter.6
3. Upon approval of the application, the Board shall give notice in
writing to the parent or guardian of an educational grant commitment
for a specified number of school days, not to exceed 180.
In case of disapproval of an application for a state or local education
expense grant, the following procedure is set up:
1. The Board of Education shall notify the applicant by registered
mail.
2. The applicant may, within 10 days after receipt of notice, apply
to the Board for a hearing.
3. The Board shall provide a prompt and fair hearing on the ques-
tion of entitlement to an education expense grant and shall render a
prompt decision.
4. If the Board affirms its disapproval, notice shall be given to the
applicant by registered mail.
5. The applicant, within 10 days, may file a petition in the Superior
Court for a hearing on all questions of fact and of law. Notice of this
petition is to be served on the Board of Education.
6. The Board has 15 days after receipt of notice within which to
prepare and furnish to the petitioner or his attorney a certified transcript
of the record in the case for filing in the Superior Court, which record
shall include a copy of the application and any official orders and rulings
of the Board in the case.
7. The petition may be heard by the resident judge of the district or
by the judge presiding at a term of court in that district, who shall
have authority to take testimony and examine into the facts, determine
all questions of fact and law and enter judgment.
8. Appeal by either the applicant or the Board from such judgment
to the Supreme Court.
Payments of education expense grants shall be made by check upon
receipt of satisfactory evidence that the child actually attended a private
nonsectarain school. Payments may be monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly
in accordance with uniform regulations adopted by the State Board of
Education. Checks are to be made payable jointly to the parent or
guardian and the private school, and mailed to the parent or guardian.
The State Board of Education is directed to prescribe standard forms
for applications for grants, for notice of grant commitments, for cer-
IN. C. GEN. STAT. C. 115-Education.
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tificates of attendance and other forms necessary or desirable in the
administration of this law. The State Board of Education has general
supervision and administration of the funds for education expense grants.
The statute, in three places, provides that a private, nonsectarian
school, which a child may attend under an education expense grant, must
be a private school recognized and approved by Article 32 of Chapter
115. 7 This article, making provisions for non-public schools, requires
that such private schools shall meet the State minimum standards as
prescribed in the course of study, that children therein shall be taught
the branches of education which are taught to children of corresponding
age and grade in the public schools, and such instruction, except for
foreign language courses, shall be given in English. Further, all private
schools and teachers employed or who give instruction therein, shall be
subject to and governed by the provisions of law for the operation of
public schools insofar as they apply to the qualifications and certifica-
tion of teachers and the promotion of pupils. Thus all teachers in pri-
vate schools must have teacher's certificates entitling them to teach cor-
responding courses or classes in the public schools. The State Board
of Education is given power to regulate and supervise all non-public
schools serving children of secondary age or younger.8
The principle is well established that the action inhibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the State.9 The adoption of standards relating to the kind or
quality of education for which state grants may be made, renders the
whole plan vulnerable to a charge of state action whose acknowledged
purpose is to permit continued segregation in the public schools. 10
Section 12 of Chapter 3 provides that no education expense grant shall
be paid for any child except for attendance at a private nonsectarian
school found to be in compliance with the provisions of the law regu-
lating private schools. In addition, the State Board of Education has
the duty of maintaining a current list of all such approved schools and
to furnish such information from time to time to county and city boards
of education. The purpose of Chapter 3 is stated in Section 1, as fol-
lows: "Our people need to be assured that no child will be forced to
attend a school with children of another race in order to get an educa-
tion. It is the purpose of the State of North Carolina to make available,
under the conditions and qualifications set out in this Act, education
7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-255 to 115-257 (1955).
' The Board of Education shall not, in its regulation of private schools, interfere
with any religious instruction. N. C. Gag. STAT. § 115-255 (1955).
O Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Comment-27 N. C. L. REv. 224
(1949).
"0 McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed." A Study of School Desegregation, 31
N. Y. U. L. REv. 991, 1047, 1079-83 (1956).
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expense grants for the private education of any child of any race re-
siding in this State."
However, the last sentence of Section 12 is apparently an attempt to
renounce state control over private schools by virtue of the payment of
education expense grants, as follows: "Payment of education expense
grants for or on behalf of any child attending such a school [approved
private school] shall not vest in the State of North Carolina, the State
Board of Education or any agency or political subdivision of the State
any supervision or control whatever over such non-public schools or any
responsibility whatever for th6ir conduct or operation." The most
likely meaning of this sentence is that no additional authority or
control over private schools is conferred by Chapter 3, Education Ex-
pense Grants. Whether there is state action involved in providing edu-
cation expense grants depends on the facts and not on a legislative
declaration disclaiming state control. 1
Parents or guardians, who elected to take education expense grants
for children in lieu of their attending desegregated schools, would waive
any constitutional objections they might otherwise have.' 2  But a citizen
and taxpayer, who had not availed himself of any benefits under the
education expense grant law, might bring a taxpayer's suit to enjoin
the payment of such grants as an unlawful use of public -funds to his
injury'3 and raise the constitutional issue-violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
11 State action does not include purely private action, Charlotte Park and
Recreation Commission v. Barringer, 242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. 2d 114 (1955) cert.
denied 350 U. S. 983 (1956), Comment, Use of Fee Simple Determinable to En-force Racial Restrictive Provisions, 34 N. C. L. REV. 113 (1955), but does include
action by any agency of the State and any level of government, executive, judicial
and legislative. It may include private action that results from mandatory state
statutes. State action may include state inaction which permits private control of
important functions, for instance, primary elections. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387
(4th Cir. 1947) ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953). State action may include
action of private organizations receiving state aid. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Li-
brary, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945) cert. denied, 326 U. S. 721 (1945), the
Library received financial aid from the city, and the city owned the real and per-
sonal property involved, audited its accounts and established rules for the appoint-
ment of trustees. A different result was reached in Norris v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (1948) where an art school was characterized
as a private instrumentality and a negro complainant who had been refused ad-
mission on account of race was denied relief. The school received a subsidy from
the state and city, but the court emphasized the fact that the management of the
school was free from public control and that the actions of the management were
not state action. See generally, State Action-A Study of Requirements under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 RACE REL. L. REv. 613 (1956) ; Comment, Legality ol
Plans for Maintaining School Segregation, 54 MIcH. L. REV. 1142 (1956).
" Note, Estoppel to raise the Constitutional Question, 34 N. C. L. REV. 514(1956) ; Convent of Sisters of St. Joseph v. Winston-Salem, 243 N. C. 316, 90
S. E. 2d 879 (1956).
" Teer v. Jordan, 232 N. C. 48, 59 S. E. 2d 359 (1950), "the right of a citizen
and taxpayer to maintain an action in the courts to restrain the unlawful use of
public funds to his injury cannot be denied." See discussion in Doremus v. Board
of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 433-35 (1952).
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Chapter 4. Local Option to suspend operation of public schools.
The legislative purpose, as stated in Section 1, is to give the "people
in each community . . . a full and meaningful choice as to whether a
public school, which may have some enforced mixing of the races, shall
continue to be maintained and supported in that community."
For the purposes of this statute, public schools are classified as:
(1) An elementary school. All or part of the first eight grades, in-
cluding the elementary portion of a union school.
(2) A high school. Grades 9 through 12, including the high school
portion of a union school.
(3) A union school, which embraces a part or all of the elementary
and high school grades.
(4) A junior high school. Grades 7, 8 and 9.
(5) A senior high school. Grades 10, 11 and 12.
Section 2 also defines "local option unit" as "Any county or city
school administrative unit, or the combination of two or more admin-
istrative units in whole or in part, or any convenient and reasonable
territorial subdivision within an administrative unit which includes
within its boundaries one or more public schools."
Section 3 tells how local option units may be established. (1) Each
county and city adminisistrative unit constitutes a local option unit; (2)
the Board of Education of any school administrative unit (city or county)
may subdivide the administrative unit into two or more local option
units; (3) two or more administrative units, in whole or in part, may
by agreement of each respective board of education constitute a local
option unit; (4) two or more different and distinct local option units
having the same or overlapping territorial boundaries may be estab-
lished within an administrative unit by the Board of Education thereof.
One or more public schools shall be included within the territorial
boundaries of each local option unit, but a specific public school shall
be included in only one local option unit at any given time. An ele-
mentary division of a union school or junior high school may be in one
local option unit and the high school division of the same school in a
different local option unit.
Any board of education, by resolution of a majority of its members,
may call for an election on the question of closing the public schools
within a local option unit which is under the board's jurisdiction. Such
an election shall be called by the board when a petition signed by 15
percent of the registered voters residing within the local option unit
is presented to the board requesting an election.
If a majority of votes cast in 'such election are in favor of suspending
the operation of the schools in such local option unit, the Board of Edu-
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cation shall suspend the operation of such public schools. Elections on
the question of reopening the closed schools are provided for under
the same terms and conditions governing elections on the question of
closing the public schools.
County boards of elections are authorized to conduct these elections
upon receipt of a certified copy of the resolution of the board of educa-
tion calling an election. Notice of the call of an election shall be given,
once a week, for four successive weeks, in a newspaper of general cir-
culation in the area, containing the date on which the election is to be
held and full information as to the schools and the local option unit in-
volved. The County Board of Elections may order a new registration of
the qualified voters concerned in an election under this statute, and may
also order a separate registration with separate registration books
exclusively for elections under this statute. The Board of Education
is to bear the cost of holding such elections.
When the operation of a public school is suspended, principals,
teachers and supervisors under contract shall continue to receive their
salaries for the term of the contract, unless and until they secure suitable
and adequate employment prior to the expiration of the term. The
term is the current school year.
A Board of Education, county or city, may from time to time sub-
divide the school administrative unit into two or more local option units,
and two or more different and distinct local option units may have the
same or overlapping territorial boundaries. Apparently, the Board may
change boundaries at will as long as one specific public school is within
that local option unit and not in any other at the same time. Such
untrammeled discretion in an administrative agency, permitting in this
situation a checkerboard of overlapping local option units, raises a ques-
tion of unlawful delegation of legislative power.14 The new section
12 of Article IX of the North Carolina Constitution specifies "any local
option unit, as defined by the General Assembly." Has the General As-
sembly provided a satisfactory definition of local option unit?
Are there any available remedies in the event that the operation of a
public school is suspended by a Board of Education following an election
in a local option unit? The purpose of Chapter 4, as already indicated,
is to meet the situation of "some enforced mixing of the races" in a
public school. For all practical purposes, this means an order of a
federal district court requiring the admission of a Negro child to a
presently segregated white public school. This is the event which the
statute would prevent by the closing of the public school involved. And
"' Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen of Goldsboro, 192 N. C. 348, 135 S. E. 50
(1926); Hospital v. Joint Committee, 234 N. C. 673, 686, 68 S. E. 2d 862, 872(1952), Barnhill, J. concurring, "they must confine their activities to the enforce-
ment of the standards established by the legislature."
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this event might occur only after a Negro parent or guardian, dissatisfied
with the assignment of his child to a segregated Negro public school,
makes application to the governing Board of Education for reassign-
ment, and the application is finally disapproved. 15 A Negro child whose
right to attend a "white" public school has been upheld by a federal
district court is likely to find that school closed. The Negro child may
still attend the "Negro" public school to which he was assigned. The
parent or guardian of such Negro child might conceivably proceed a
second time in the federal courts to secure admission to the next con-
veniently located "white" public school. Again, and after much time
has elapsed, the Negro child, if successful, may be faced with another
closed school. Obviously, the "white" public school, whose operation is
suspended, is just as effectively closed to all of its former students.
It is not to be doubted that the United States Constitution does
not require that a state afford any education to its children. But no
state has abolished its public school system or completely denied any
support for public education. It is not likely that North Carolina will
do so. Chapter 4 provides, in effect, for the discontinuance of public
support for separate public schools. The closing of a public school is
thus pursuant to state statute and the result of state action. The closing
of a "white" public school brings about a difference in treatment of the
one administrative unit where the school is closed from that accorded
other administrative units comparably situated, and this difference occurs
because of the enforced mixing of the races in the school in question.
Apparently, there is set up a classification scheme, vulnerable to attack
as a denial of equal protection not only to the Negro child involved but
to the white child whose school has been closed.
White children in other localities would be able to attend public
schools. Negro children in the same locality would be able to attend a
public school. A dissatisfied parent or guardian might apply for an
education expense grant, which assumes an approved, conveniently
located, private, nonsectarian school. If such a grant is acceptable, the
parent or guardain would be estopped to attack constitutionality.'0 But
if there were no private schools available or if a parent or guardian could
not afford to send his child to a private school or preferred a public
education for his child, he might seek to enjoin the appropriate state
officials from suspending the operation of the public school in question.
The existence of a "Negro" public school in the locality would not pre-
clude such action. It is not likely that a white parent would make an
1956 ExTRA SEss. LAws, Ch. 7-The Pupil Assignment Act.
" See note 12 supra.
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application to have his child assigned to a "Negro" public school, 17 where
a "white" public school has been closed, and, in the event that such an
application were made, the Board of Education, pursuant to the purpose
and policy of the 1956 statutes, would reject it.
The public school injunction suits in the federal courts have been
brought under Section 1983, Title 42, United States Code, which pro-
vides:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
In these cases,' 8 a prayer for injunctive relief is usually accompanied
by a prayer for declaratory judgment establishing the rights of the plain-
tiffs in the premises. In a proper case, an action for damages may be
maintained. 19 In Carson v. Board of Education, the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, stated, "Dis-
crimination on account of race and color was alleged with respect to
the right to attend schools in Old Fort, and the removal of this discrim-
ination as well as the declaration of the rights of plaintiffs was asked.
The decision of the Supreme Court did not destroy or restrict these
rights, except with respect to the right to separate schools, and the
plaintiffs were entitled to have their prayers for declaratory judgment
as well as for general injunctive relief considered in the light of the
Supreme Court decision. '20
Chapter 5. Amendment of compulsory school attendance law.
Every parent, guardian or other person in charge of a child between
the ages of seven and sixteen years shall cause such child to attend
school continuously for a period equal to the time which the public
school shall be in session.21  To this general requirement of the law,
Chapter 5 adds the following proviso:
"7In Romero v. Weakley, 226 F. 2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955), one of the plaintiffs
was a white person, claiming that his white child was segregated from a school
wrongly limited to Negro and Mexican descended children, and compelled to
attend a more distant school of white children.
" The first four issues (Feb., April, June and Aug. 1956) RAcE RELATIONS
LAW REPORTE, contain reports of 23 federal district court decisions in public
school cases.
9 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1926) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649(1944). Actions for damages for refusing plaintiffs the right to vote in the
Democratic Party Primary.
"0 Carson v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 227 F. 2d 789, 790 (4th
Cir. 1955).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 115-166 (1955).
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"provided, this requirement shall not apply with respect to any child
when the board of education of the administrative unit in which the
child resides find that: (a) such child is now assigned against the wishes
of his parent or guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to such
child, to a public school attended by a child of another race and it is
not reasonable and practicable to reassign such child to a public school
not attended by a child of another race; and (b) it is not reasonable
and practicable for such child to attend a private non-sectarian school..."
This proviso assumes a situation which Chapters 3 and 4 make
every effort to avoid, that is, a school attended by both white and Negro
children. Chapter 3 provides for education expense grants for the dis-
satisfied parent or guardian and Chapter 4 provides for the closing of
such mixed school. But if such mixed school should exist in North
Carolina, the compulsory school attendance laws do not apply to a dis-
satisfied parent or guardian if it is not reasonable and practicable to
assign the child to a public school not attended by a child of another
race and not reasonable or practicable for such child to attend a private
nonsectarian school.
The last provision would cover cases where the parent or guardian
could not afford to send his child to a private school, or where there was
no approved private nonsectarian school conveniently located, so that
such children would actually be deprived of education in either public
or private schools, as their parents or guardians chose.
Chapter 7. Pupil Assignment Act.
Chapter 7 is a revision of the School Enrollment law of 1955. The
words "assignment" and "assign" are used throughout instead of "en-
rollment" and "enroll." The 1955 Act vested authority in city and
county boards of education to provide for the enrollment in a public
school within their administrative units of each child residing within
such administrative unit.22  Under the 1956 Act, local school boards
have authority to provide for the assignment to any school-not limited
to a school within that administrative unit-of each child residing within
the administrative unit. Each board of education may adopt reasonable
rules and regulations as in the opinion of the board are necessary for
implementing this power. As in the 1955 Act, the standards laid down
to guide local boards are very broad. "Each county and city board of
education shall make assignments of pupils to public schools so as to
provide for the orderly and efficient administration of the public schools,
and provide for the effective instruction, health, safety, and general
welfare of the pupils." The statute makes no mention of race as a
criterion for assignment.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955).
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A new section 23 provides for notice of assignment, which may be a
written notice of assignment on each pupil's report card or by written
notice by any feasible means to the parent or guardian of each child. In
the case of assignment of groups or categories of pupils, notice may be
given by publication in a newspaper having general circulation in the
administrative unit.
A dissatisfied parent or guardian may, within ten days after notifica-
tion of the assignment or the last publication thereof, apply in writing
to the board of education for reassignment of a child to a different public
school. If the application is disapproved, the board shall notify the ap-
plicant by registered mail and the applicant may, within five days, apply
to the board for a hearing and "shall be entitled to a prompt and fair
hearing on the question of reassignment of such child to a different
school." The majority of the members of the board shall be a quorum
for such hearing and for passing upon applications for reassignment.
"If, at the hearing, the board shall find that the child is entitled to be
reassigned to such school, or if the board shall find that the reassignment
of the child to such school will be for the best interests of the child,
and will not endanger the health or safety of the children there en-
rolled, the board shall direct that the child be reassigned to and admitted
to such school. The board shall render prompt decision upon the
hearing, and notice of the decision shall be given to the applicant by
registered mall."
This hearing is the only administrative remedy provided by the 1956
Act. Unlike the 1955 Act, there is no provision for appeal to the
superior court from an adverse decision of the board of education.2 4
In the case of Carson v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 2
action was brought by certain Negro children to enjoin alleged discrim-
ination against them in the administration of the schools of McDowell
County, North Carolina. The complaint was filed prior to the decision
of the Supreme Court in the school segregation case. It alleged that
the plaintiffs were not allowed to attend schools maintained by defendants
for white children in the town of Old Fort but were required to go to
a school in Marion 15 miles away and that this discrimination was made
solely on account of race and color. One of the prayers for relief was
that defendants be required to provide for plaintiffs in the town of Old
Fort educational facilities equal to those provided for white children.
There was a general prayer for injunctive relief against discrimination
and a prayer for a declaratory judgment establishing the rights of the
plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that
23 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 115-177 (1956).24N. C. GEN. STAT. § 115-179 (1955).
' 227 F. 2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955).
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the decision of the Supreme Court had made inappropriate the relief
prayed for. The Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order of the
District Court and remanded the case with directions to consider it in
the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the school segregation
case and of the 1955 North Carolina statute, which had been enacted
subsequent to the bringing of the action, providing an administrative
remedy for persons who feel aggrieved with respect to their enrollment
in the public schools. The Court stated the rule as to exhaustion of
state administrative remedies, as follows:
"This rule is especially applicable to a case such as this, where in-
junction is asked against state or county officers with respect to the
control of schools maintained and supported by the state. The federal
courts manifestly cannot operate the schools. All that they have the
power to do in the premises is to enjoin violation of constitutional rights
in the operation of schools by state authorities. Where the state law
provides adequate administrative procedure for the protection of such
rights, the federal courts manifestly should not interfere with the opera-
tion of the schools until such administrative procedure has been ex-
hausted and the intervention of the federal courts is shown to be neces-
sary."' 26
The district court was empowered to stay proceedings pending the
exhaustion of administrative remedies under the statute and to order
a repleader if this were desirable. In July, 1956, District Judge Warlick
ruled that complainants had not exhausted administrative remedies and
refused plaintiffs' petition to file supplemental pleadings. Plantiffs then
brought a petition for mandamus to the Circuit Court of Appeals to
order Judge Warlick to hear the case on its merits and to permit the
filing of supplemental pleadings. This petition was argued before the
Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond on October 1, 1956. A news-
paper account indicates that the court raised a question as to whether,
under the rule of exhaustion of state administrative remedies, the Su-
perior Court, on appeal from the board of education, would be acting
as an administrative or a judicial body.2 7
- Carson v. Board of Education, 227 F. 2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1955).
'7 Raleigh News and Observer, October 2, 1956, p. 1. It is doubtful whether
under existing precedents, the federal courts would be required to consider state
court review of school authorities' decisions as a part of the administrative process
vhich must be exhausted. The 1955 Pupil Enrollment Act provides that upon such
appeal, "the matter shall be heard de novo in the superior court before a jury in
the same maner as civil actions are tried and disposed of therein." N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 115-179 (1955).
"While the federal district courts might accept jurisdiction once relief has been
sought before the state administrative body, it might be thought desirable to
include judicial review of the administrative action before applying the exhaustion
rule. This might more readily follow where judicial review is limited to the facts
found in the record of the board of education. But where a trial de novo before
a jury is provided, the review in the superior court could hardly be considered
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Meanwhile, the plaintiffs in the Old Fort case proceeded with the
administrative remedies provided by the 1955 Pupil Enrollment Act.28
A petition was presented to the McDowell County Board of Education
on August 27, 1955, as follows:
"The undersigned, on behalf of their own children and on behalf
of other Negro children and parents similarly situated, petition your
Board that you forthwith issue a directive, order or mandate to the
aforesaid Superintendent and Principal requiring them forthwith to
admit children of petitioners and other Negro children similarly situated
to the school and school facilities maintained by your Board in the Town
of Old Fort."
The petitioners appeared before the Board in support of their re-
quest. In a letter dated January 5, 1956, the petitioners were informed
of the denial of their request, as follows:
"A request on the part of Taylor and Mitchell on behalf of the
Negroes of Old Fort to allow Negroes to attend school at Old Fort
rather than to be transporated to Marion to attend school at Hudgins
High, was formally denied by virtue of necessity in that facilities and
room are available at Hudgins High and are not available at Old Fort."
An appeal was then taken to the Superior Court, as provided by
the 1955 Act, and defendant's demurrer on the ground that there was
a misjoinder of both parties and causes of action was sustained.20 The
North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from this ruling,
holding that the 1955 Pupil Enrollment Act provides for an applica-
tion for assignment relating to named individuals, whereas this is in
reality a class suit, which constitutes a misjoinder of parties and causes
of action.30
Covington v. Montgomery County Board of Education' is a third
"legislative" or "administrative." See Note, Obstacles to Federal Jurisdiction:
New Barriers to Non-Segregated Public Education it; Old Forms, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 974-997 (1956).
On November 14, 1956, the petition for mandamus to order District Judge
Warlick to proceed with the McDowell County school suit was declined by theFourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Raleigh News and Observer, November 15,
1956, p. 1.28N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-176 to 115-179 (1955).
. Defendant's demurrer on the ground that the petition failed to state a cause
of action was overruled.30 Joyner v. McDowell County Board of Education, 244 N. C. 164, 92 S. E. 2d
795 (1956). Note, Pleading and Parties-Class Actions in North Carolina, 26
N .C. L. REv. 223 (1948). The North Carolina holding that a class action could
not be brought under the Pupil Assignment Law in the superior court, is not
controlling in the federal courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23,
governs the bringing of class actions in the federal district court. A number of
the public school segregation cases in the federal courts are class actions. Brown
v. Rippy, 233 F. 2d 796 (5th Cir. 1956); McSwain v. Board of Education, 214
F. 2d 131 (6th Cir. 1954) ; see note 17 supra.
" Covington v. Board of Education, 139 F. Supp. 161 (M. D. N. C. 1956).
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case involving the Old Fort petitioners. On September 7, 1955, Dis-
trict judge Hayes had refused to constitute a three-judge court on the
ground that the pleadings did not show that defendants were state
officers and undertaking to enforce state statutes. An amendment to the
complaint was made alleging that defendants maintained certain schools
for white children exclusively and other schools exclusively for Negro
children and that in the performance of these acts the defendants were
acting pursuant to state constitutional provisions and state statutes and,
as such, were officers of the State of North Carolina enforcing and exe-
cuting state statutes and policies. The Court found that this was the
case, saying, "The Montgomery school officials are appointed (elected)
by the Legislature of North Carolina and are paid by the State; they
expend for the State the school funds of the State allocated to Mont-
gomery County. There can be no real doubt that they are acting as
officers of the State and therefore meet one of the tests for determining
the requisite of the jurisdiction of a three-judge court."32
The Court found, however, that the second requisite for giving
a three-judge court jurisdiction was lacking-"the suit must seek to
have a state Statute declared unconstitutional." This means that there
must be a real controversy presented as to the constitutionality of the
State Constitution, statutes or orders of State Boards compelling segre-
gation in the public schools of the state. The Court found that this
was lacking and stated why a three-judge court was not necessary, as
follows:
"The validity of that part of the North Carolina Constitution re-
quiring separate schools for the two races is no longer the subject of
legal controversy. Nor is any statute,-state or local-, or order of a
Board compelling segregation in the public schools, a legal controversy
now....
"If, then, the State Constitution or statutes or orders required that
separate schools for the races must be maintained, it follows as the night
the day that, being in conflict with the Constitution of the United States
as defined by the Supreme Court, they are to that extent, null and void.
No three-judge court is needed to make that declaration .... If the de-
fendants are discriminating against the plaintiff, it will be the duty of a
one-judge court to hear and determine the facts. '33
. The 1956 pupil assignment law provides for a single step admin-
istrative remedy-application to the board of education for reassign-
ment of a child to a different school, a prompt and fair hearing of this
application before the board and a prompt decision by the board with
32 Id. at 162.
"Id. at 163. See statements of the Court in Constantian v. Anson County,
244 N. C. 221, 227-229, 93 S. E. 2d 163, 167-68 (1956).
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notice thereof to the applicant. A parent or guardian, dissatisfied with
the board's decision, might proceed in the federal courts at this point,
as no further administrative remedy is provided by the State. This, of
course, assumes the contention of a complainant that he had been
denied access to a state public school solely on the basis of race or color,
which would state a federal claim giving the district court jurisdiction
under either the "federal question"3 4 or the civil rights85 provision of
the Judicial Code.
3'28 U. S. C. 1331.
5 28 U. S. C. 1343 (3).
